Abstract-The growing competition drives the mobile network operators (MNOs) to explore adding time flexibility to the traditional data plan, which consists of a monthly subscription fee, a data cap, and a per-unit fee for exceeding the data cap. The rollover data plan, which allows the unused data of the previous month to be used in the current month, provides the subscribers with the time flexibility. In this paper, we formulate two MNOs' market competition as a three-stage game, where the MNOs decide their data mechanisms (traditional or rollover) in Stage I and the pricing strategies in Stage II, and then users make their subscription decisions in Stage III. Different from the monopoly market where an MNO always prefers the rollover mechanism over the traditional plan in terms of profit, MNOs may adopt different data mechanisms at an equilibrium. Specifically, the high-QoS MNO would gradually abandon the rollover mechanism as its QoS advantage diminishes. Meanwhile, the low-QoS MNO would progressively upgrade to the rollover mechanism. The numerical results show that the market competition significantly limits MNOs' profits, but both MNOs obtain higher profits with the possible choice of the rollover data plan.
INTRODUCTION

Background and Motivation
The Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) profit from the mobile data services through offering carefully designed mobile data plans. The traditional and most widely implemented data plan is a three-part tariff, involving a monthly one-time subscription fee, a data cap that is free to use (with the paid subscription fee), and a per-unit fee for any data consumption exceeding the data cap. In today's telecommunication market, the most commonly adopted data caps include 1GB, 2GB, and 3GB [2] . However, the corresponding subscription fee for the same data cap varies significantly in different MNOs' data plans. For example, the subscription fee of the 2GB data plan is $55 for AT&T subscribers [3] , while it is $35 for Verizon subscribers [4] . The different pricing decisions mainly result from the MNOs' market competition, since different MNOs usually offer different quality of services (QoS) and experience different costs for wireless data services [5] .
To maintain the competitiveness in the market competition, many MNOs (e.g., AT&T in the US [6] , and China Mobile in mainland China [7] ) have recently adopted the rollover data plans, allowing the unused data from the previous month to be used in the current month. Such a rollover mechanism is more time-flexible than the traditional mechanism, since it reduces users' concerns of the possible wasting data within the data cap and the possible overage data consumption above the data cap when the user cannot accurately estimate his future data demand. Hence, the rollover data plan is very attractive to the mobile users. Our earlier study in [8] , [9] found that in a monopoly market with a single MNO, the rollover mechanism can increase both the MNO's profit and users' payoffs, hence improves the social welfare. That is, a monopoly MNO should definitely adopt the rollover mechanism. In this paper, we want to understand whether this is still true when considering the ubiquitous market competition. In practice, the four main MNOs in the US market all adopt the rollover mechanism. In the Europe and Hong Kong, however, we do not observe all of the MNOs adopting the rollover mechanism. For example, some MNOs (e.g., Orange and China Mobile Hong Kong) are still using the traditional mechanism without time flexibility. These observations motivate us to ask the following two key questions in a competitive market: Question 1. Will all MNOs offering rollover mechanism become the equilibrium of the market competition? Question 2. How will the different data mechanisms change the MNOs' pricing competition?
To address the above questions, this paper studies the MNOs' market competition in terms of their rollover data mechanism offering and the pricing strategy. To abstract the interactions among the competitive MNOs and the heterogeneous users, we focus on the two-MNO case (i.e., duopoly market) in this paper, and we will study the multiple MNO case (i.e., oligopoly market) in our future work (with some preliminary discussions in Appendix A). We hope that our results in this paper could help understand how the competitive MNOs choose their data mechanisms and make the pricing decisions.
Solutions and Contributions
We study the economic interactions between two competitive MNOs and a group of heterogeneous mobile users. We use a three-stage game model to characterize the MNOs' rollover mechanism adoption and pricing decisions, as well as users' subscriptions. To be more specific, the two MNOs simultaneously decide their data mechanisms (traditional or rollover) in Stage I, and the corresponding pricing strategies (including subscription fee and the per-unit fee) for the same data caps in Stage II. Finally, users make their subscription decisions to maximize their payoffs in Stage III.
The main results and key contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• Duopoly Competition for Mobile Data Plans with Time Flexibility: To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that systematically studies the MNOs' duopoly competition considering their rollover data mechanism offering and pricing decisions.
• A Three-Stage Competition Model: We formulate the MNOs' market competition and users' subscription as a three-stage game. Despite the complexity of the game, we characterize the equilibrium considering MNOs' heterogeneity in the Quality-of-Service (QoS) and the operational cost, as well as users' heterogeneity in their data valuations.
• Data Mechanism Equilibrium: Our analysis shows that the high-QoS MNO would gradually abandon the rollover mechanism as its QoS advantage diminishes (due to its increasing cost or the competitor's decreasing cost). In this progress, however, the low-QoS MNO has the opportunity to upgrade to the rollover mechanism. Particularly, the market competition shares some similarity with that of the anti-coordination game when the MNOs have similar QoS and experience comparable cost. That is, no matter who adopts the rollover mechanism, the other will choose to adopt the traditional one.
• Evaluation based on Empirical Data: The numerical results based on the empirical data show that the market competition significantly reduces MNO's profits. Furthermore, both MNOs can obtain higher profits when they have the choice of adopting the rollover mechanism in the duopoly market. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related works. Section 3 introduces the system model. Section 4 studies users' subscriptions. Section 5 investigates MNOs' pricing competition. Section 6 analyzes MNOs' data mechanism adoptions. Section 7 provides numerical results. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 8.
RELATED LITERATURE
There have been many excellent studies on mobile data pricing (e.g., [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] ). However, these prior studies did not take into account the recently introduced rollover mechanism or the ubiquitous market competition in practice.
The rollover data mechanism has been recently studied (e.g., [8] , [9] , [14] , [15] , [16] ). Zheng et al. in [14] examined such an innovative data mechanism and found that moderately price-sensitive users can benefit from subscribing [16] × [17] - [20] × This Paper to the rollover data plan. Wei et al. in [15] analyzed the impact of different rollover period lengths from the MNO's perspective. In our previous work [8] , [9] , we proposed a unified framework for different rollover mechanisms and studied the corresponding optimal design under the singlecap and multi-cap schemes. Moreover, we examined the economic viability of the rollover mechanism and the data trading market [16] . However, all of these studies only considered the monopoly case and neglected the ubiquitous market competition in practice.
There are many studies related to multiple MNOs' market competitions in terms of their pricing decisions (e.g., [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] ). For example, Gibbens et al. in [17] focused on the Paris Metro pricing scheme and analyzed the competition between two ISPs who offer multiple service classes. Later on Chau et al. in [18] further considered a more general competition model and derived the necessary conditions for the equilibrium. Ma et al. in [19] focused on the usage-based scheme and considered the congestion-prone scenario with multiple MNOs. Ren et al. in [20] focused on users' aggregate data demand dynamics, and optimized the MNO's data plans and long-term network capacity decisions. However, none of these studies considered the MNOs' different rollover data mechanisms offering.
In this paper, we study MNOs' market competition in terms of the rollover mechanism adoption and the pricing decisions.
SYSTEM MODEL
We study the market competition between two MNOs who face a common pool of mobile users. We formulate the system interactions as a three-stage game and characterize how the MNOs' heterogeneity in the Quality-of-Service (QoS) and the operational cost, as well as users' heterogeneity in the data valuations, affect the various decisions.
Each MNO-n (n = 1, 2) offers a mobile data plan specified by a tuple T n = {Q n , Π n , π n , κ n }: a subscriber of MNO-n needs to pay a monthly subscription fee Π n for the data cap Q n , and possibly some usage-based overage fee π n for each unit of data consumption exceeding the data cap Q n . Here κ n ∈ {T, R} denotes the data mechanism that the MNO-n adopts. Specifically, κ n = T represents the traditional mechanism, while κ n = R represents the rollover mechanism.
For κ n = R, the rollover data "inherited" from the previous month is consumed prior to the current monthly data cap and expires at the end of the current month. 1 Basically, the rollover data enlarges a subscriber's effective data cap within which no overage fee involved. Based on 1 . In practice, there are two different consumption priorities, which has been studied in our previous work. We refer interested readers to [8] , [21] for more details.
Stage II
Each MNO-announces the subscription fee and per-unit fee and .
Stage III
Each type-user makes his subscription choice to maximzie his payoff.
Stage I
Each MNO-determines its data mechanism and . our previous study of the monopoly market in [8] , [21] , here we denote τ as a user's rollover data at the beginning of a month, and Q e κn (τ ) as the effective cap of the current month under MNO-n's data plan T n = {Q n , Π n , π n , κ n }.
• The case of κ n = T denotes the traditional data mechanism without rollover data, i.e., τ = 0. The effective cap of each month is Q e T (τ ) = Q n ; • The case of κ n = R denotes the rollover data mechanism.
The rollover data τ ∈ [0, Q n ] from the previous month enlarges the effective cap of the current month, i.e., Q e R (τ ) = Q n + τ . We study the two MNOs' market competition in terms of their rollover mechanism adoption and pricing decisions, given the same data caps (e.g., Q 1 = Q 2 = 1GB).
2 As illustrated in Fig. 1 , in Stage I, two MNOs simultaneously announce their data mechanisms κ 1 and κ 2 . In Stage II, two MNOs simultaneously determine the corresponding prices s 1 = {Π 1 , π 1 } and s 2 = {Π 2 , π 2 }. 3 Finally, users will make their subscription choices in Stage III.
Next we introduce users' payoffs and the MNOs' profits in Section 3.1 and Section 3.2, respectively. Table 2 summarizes some key notations in this paper.
Users' Payoffs
User Characteristics
Now we introduce three characterizations of a user: the data demand d, the data valuation θ, and the network substitutability β. Based on these, we will derive a user's monthly expected payoff.
First, we model a user's data demand d as a discrete random variable with a probability mass function f (d), a mean value ofd, and a finite integer support {0, 1, 2, ..., D} [20] . Here the data demand is measured in the minimum data unit (e.g., 1KB or 1MB according to the MNOs).
Second, we denote θ as a user's utility from consuming one unit of data, i.e., the user's data valuation as in [19] , [23] .
2. In practice, MNOs usually offer multiple data caps, e.g., 1GB, 2GB, or 3GB. We have studied the multi-cap optimization problem for a monopoly MNO in [9] . Here we assume that the two MNOs have the same data cap, and focus on the impact of the pricing and the choice of data mechanism.
3. The competition model is motivated by practical observations: an MNO usually fixes a data mechanism over a relatively long time (e.g., three or five years), and updates the price choices more frequently (e.g., on a yearly basis). This formulation captures the MNO's different decisions at different time scales. Moreover, to reveal the impact of the rollover mechanism on MNOs' market competition, we assume that MNOs make simultaneous decisions in each stage. We will consider the sequential decision process (as in [22] ) in our future work. 
Symbols
Physical Meaning
MNO
Qn
The data cap of MNO-n.
Πn
The subscription fee of MNO-n. πn The overage usage fee of MNO-n. κn The data mechanism of MNO-n. sn The pricing decision (sn = {Πn, πn}) of MNO-n. ρn The quality of service (QoS) of MNO-n. cn The marginal operational cost of MNO-n. ψn
The cost-quality ratio of MNO-n, i.e., ψn = cn/ρn. σn
The threshold user type of MNO-n.
Wn
The expected profit of MNO-n. σ
The neutral user type of the two MNOs.
User θ A user's valuation for consuming one unit data. β Users' common network substitutability.
Vκ n
The expected usage of an MNO-n's subscriber.
Un
The expected payoff of an MNO-n's subscriber.
According to the empirical results from [8] , in the telecom market of mainland China, the users' data valuations follow a gamma distribution, and falls into the range between 10 RMB/GB and 60 RMB/GB with a large probability. Third, we consider a user's behavior change after he exceeds the effective cap. Although the user will still continue consuming data, he will reduce his consumption by relying more heavily on alternative networks (such as office or home Wi-Fi networks). Following [24] , we characterize such a behavior by a user's network substitutability β ∈ [0, 1], which denotes the fraction of overage usage shrink. For example, β = 0.6 means that on average, 60% of the user's portion of data demand above the effective cap will be reduced. A larger β corresponds to more overage usage reduction (hence, a better network substitutability). The empirical results in [8] show that most people would shrink 85% ∼ 95% overage usage. That is, users do not differ significantly in terms of their network substitutability.
In the following, we normalize the total population size to be one and follow [25] , [26] by exploring users' heterogeneity in the data valuation θ. Hence we characterize each user according to his type θ. The distribution of θ of the entire user population has a PDF h(θ) and CDF H(θ) with the support [0, θ max ].
User Payoff under Different Data Mechanisms
Next we introduce users' payoffs based on their characteristics and the effect of different data mechanisms.
A user's payoff is the difference between his utility and the total payment. More specifically, for an MNOn's subscriber with d units of data demand and an effective data cap Q e κn (τ ), his actual data consumption is
+ , where [x] + = max{0, x}. Moreover, we use ρ n to represent the MNO-n's average quality of service (QoS). 4 Mathematically, the parameter ρ n is a utility multiplicative coefficient, thus the subscriber's utility is
. In addition, the subscriber's total payment consists of the subscription fee Π n and the overage 4 . An MNO's wireless data service depends on the network congestion, which has been studied before (e.g., [5] , [19] ). In this work, instead of modeling the detailed congestion-aware control, we are more interested in the long-term average quality of the MNO's wireless data service. Hence the parameter ρ represents the impact of the MNO's average QoS on users' utilities of consuming data.
+ . Therefore, a type-θ MNO-n subscriber's payoff with a data demand d and an effective cap Q
For κ n = R, the data demand d and the rollover data τ in (1) are two random variables that change in each month. However, for κ n = T, the rollover data τ in (1) is always zero, the randomness only lies in the monthly data demand d. Therefore, we take the expectation over d (and τ ) to get a type-θ user's expected monthly payoff under T n as follows:
Here A κn (Q n ) is the user's expected monthly overage data consumption under T n , which is given by
(3) Note that in (2) , the difference between the traditional and rollover mechanisms is entirely captured by A κn (·). Specifically, p R (·) represents the distribution of the subscriber's rollover data. In our previous work [8] , [21] , we have introduced how to compute p R (·) in detail, and obtained the following inequality
which indicates that a user incurs less overage data consumption under the rollover mechanism R. This is why we say that the rollover mechanism R offers a better time flexibility than the traditional mechanism T. In this paper, we will directly use this conclusion, and refer interested readers to Section 4 in [8] for more details. Later on, we will study two MNOs' competition given their same data caps. To facilitate our later analysis, here we further define V κn as
which represents the user's expected monthly data consumption under the data mechanism κ n . According to (4), we know that the rollover mechanism R encourages users to consume more data, i.e.,
The inequality (6) plays a significant roles when we analyze MNOs' competition over their data mechanisms, we will further discuss it in Section 6.
Substituting (5) into (2), we can write a type-θ T n subscriber's expected monthly payoff as
where ρ n V κn represents the user's utility increment for unit data valuation increment under the subscription of MNOn. In the following analysis, we will directly use (7). To emphasize its dependence on the data mechanism κ n and the pricing strategy s n = {Π n , π n }, sometimes we will writē U n (T n , θ) asŪ n (κ n , s n , θ).
MNOs' Profits in Competition
Next we focus on two MNOs' market competition and derive their profits given their data mechanism adoption κ = {κ 1 , κ 2 } and the pricing strategies s = {s 1 , s 2 }.
MNO Revenue
The MNO's revenue from a single subscriber includes the subscription fee and the overage payment. Therefore, the expected monthly revenue of MNO-n from a type-θ subscriber isR
where
is the subscriber's expected monthly overage payment. Therefore, the expected monthly revenue of MNO-n from all its subscribers is
where Φ n (κ, s) ⊆ [0, θ max ] denotes the subscribers of MNOn under data mechanism κ and pricing strategy s. We will further discuss the calculation over the user type θ in Section 4.
MNO Cost
As for the MNO's cost, we focus on its operational expenditure (OpEx). Specifically, it is proportional to the total data consumption of the MNO's subscribers [27] . The total expected data consumption of MNO-n's subscribers is
where V κn defined in (5) represents a user's expected monthly data consumption under T n . For analysis tractability, we follow [27] by considering a linear cost, and denote c n as MNO-n's marginal cost from unit data consumption. 5 Accordingly, the total cost of MNO-n is
MNO Profit
The MNO-n's profit W n (κ, s) is defined as the difference between its revenue and cost, i.e.,
Now we have formulated MNOs' profits in the duopoly market, and introduced MNOs' two orthogonal characteristics: the QoS parameter ρ n as in (7) and the marginal cost parameter as c n in (11). Next we use backward induction to study the three-stage game.
USER SUBSCRIPTION IN STAGE III
In Stage III, each user makes his subscription decision given the two MNOs' pricing strategies s = {s 1 , s 2 } in Stage II and data mechanism κ = {κ 1 , κ 2 } in Stage I. Specifically, a type-θ user will subscribe to MNO-n if MNOn can bring him a larger (among the two MNOs) and nonnegative payoff. For notation simplicity, we first introduce two definitions in Section 4.1, then we present the duopoly market partition in Section 4.2.
5. Such a linear-form cost has been widely used to model the operator's operational cost (e.g., [25] , [28] ). 
Threshold User Type and Neutral User Type
Threshold User Type
We introduce the threshold user type σ n of MNO-n in Definition 1.
Definition 1 (Threshold User Type). The MNO-n's threshold user type σ n ∈ [0, θ max ] corresponds to the user who achieves a zero expected payoff, i.e.,Ū n (κ n , s n , σ n ) = 0.
6 Thus, σ n is
Note from (13) that the MNO-n's threshold user type σ n (κ n , s n ) depends on its data mechanism κ n and the pricing strategy s n = {Π n , π n }. Moreover, ρ n V κn in (13) represents the user's utility increment for unit data valuation increment under the subscription of MNO-n. For notation simplicity, we define ξ(κ) as in (14) , which will be used in Section 4.1.2 for the definition of the neutral user type.
Note that ξ(κ) depends on the MNOs' data mechanisms κ = {κ 1 , κ 2 }. Since we will analyze users' subscription (in Section 4) and MNOs' pricing competition (in Section 5) given data mechanism selection κ from Stage I, without loss of generality, we make Assumption 1 in Section 4 and Section 5. That is, under the data mechanism selection κ in Stage I, MNO-1 has an advantage in terms of ρ n V κn among the two MNOs, i.e., its subscribers' marginal utility change for one unit data valuation increment is larger. Hence we say MNO-1 is "stronger".
Assumption 1.
Given the data mechanism κ, ξ(κ) < 1.
Note that Assumption 1 is not a technical assumption that limits our contributions for two reasons. First, we can use a similar approach to analyze the case of ξ(κ) > 1 (by switching the indices of the two MNOs). Second, the case of ξ(κ) = 1 corresponds to the well-known Bertrand competition [29] , which is actually a degeneration of the case ξ(κ) < 1 and ξ(κ) > 1. We refer interested readers to Appendix C for more detailed discussions.
Neutral User Type
We introduce the neutral user typeσ between the two MNOs in Definition 2. 6 . Among the user group defined by θ ∈ [0, θmax], all users experience a negative payoff if σn(κn, sn) > θmax.
Definition 2 (Neutral User Type). The neutral user type, denoted byσ, is a user type who can achieve the same payoff by subscribing to either MNO, i.e.,
We can deriveσ as follows
where σ 1 and σ 2 are two MNOs' threshold user types defined in Definition 1.
So far we have introduced the threshold user type and the neutral user type. Next let us move on to the subscription equilibrium in the duopoly market.
Duopoly Market Partition
Based on Definitions 1 and 2, we summarize the market partition in Theorem 1. The proof is given in Appendix D.
Theorem 1 (Market Partition Equilibrium).
Consider MNOs' threshold user types σ 1 and σ 2 under the data mechanism κ = {κ 1 , κ 2 } and the pricing strategy s = {s 1 , s 2 }. The market partition equilibrium, denoted by Φ * 1 (κ, s) and Φ * 2 (κ, s), has three cases in the (σ 1 , σ 2 ) plane shown in Fig. 2 . 1) Σ 1 : MNO-1 has a much larger threshold user type than MNO-2, i.e., (σ 1 , σ 2 ) ∈ Σ 1 where Σ 1 is
In this case, MNO-2's market share corresponds to the users with θ in Φ *
In this case, MNO-1 has a market share of Φ * 1 (κ, s) = [σ 1 , θ max ], while MNO-2 has a zero market share of Φ * 2 (κ, s) = ∅, as shown in Fig. 3(b) . 3) Σ 3 : MNO-1 has a slightly larger threshold user type than MNO-2, i.e., (σ 1 , σ 2 ) ∈ Σ 3 where Σ 3 is Theorem 1 reveals two market partition equilibriums, i.e., coexistence (i.e., Σ 3 ) or one-MNO-surviving (i.e., Σ 1 , and Σ 2 ), depending on the data mechanism κ and the pricing strategy s. Note that the one-MNO-surviving result is different from the monopoly case, since the zero market share MNO in the one-MNO-surviving case might still affect the decisions of the surviving MNO. We will further discuss it in Section 5.1.
MNOS' PRICING COMPETITION IN STAGE II
In Stage II, the MNOs simultaneously determine the pricing strategies s={s 1 , s 2 }, given their data mechanisms κ={κ 1 , κ 2 } in Stage I and the market partition equilibrium in Stage III.
We substitute the subscription equilibrium Φ * 1 (κ, s) and Φ * 2 (κ, s) from Theorem 1 into (12) and derive the two MNOs' profits as follows: (20) where σ 1 , σ 2 , andσ depend on the pricing strategies s and data mechanisms κ.
According to (19) and (20), we note that the MNOs' profits at the equilibrium of Stage III are uniquely determined by the data mechanism κ = {κ 1 , κ 2 } and the threshold user types σ = {σ 1 , σ 2 }. Moreover, (13) shows that MNO-n is able to achieve an arbitrary threshold user type σ n (κ n , s n ) by adjusting the pricing strategies s n = {Π n , π n }. Hence the MNOs' price competition in Stage II is equivalent to the following threshold competition game:
Game 1 (Threshold Competition in Stage II). Given the data mechanism κ = {κ 1 , κ 2 }, the two MNOs' threshold competition in Stage II can be modeled as the following game:
• Players: MNO-n for both n = 1, 2.
• Strategies: Each MNO-n determines its threshold user type σ n ∈ [c n /ρ n , θ max ].
• Preferences: Each MNO-n obtains a profit W n (κ, σ).
Next we will study the MNOs' best responses of Game 1 in Section 5.1, then find the the equilibrium which corresponds to the fixed point of the best responses in Section 5.2. Before that, we introduce two notations as follows.
• σ MP n (κ n ): Part of the best response analysis is related to the MNO-n's optimal threshold user type σ MP n (κ n ) given the data mechanism κ n in the monopoly market, which is studied in our previous work [8] , [21] . In the following, we will directly use σ MP n (κ n ) and provide more details in Appendix B.
• ψ n : As we will see later, the MNO's cost-QoS ratio c n /ρ n plays a significant role in the best response analysis. For notation simplicity, we define ψ n as follows:
Best Response Analysis
Since we have assumed that MNO-1 is stronger and MNO-2 is weaker, the two MNOs' best responses will be different. We will investigate the best response of MNO-2 and MNO-1 in Section 5.1.1 and Section 5.1.2, respectively.
Best Response of the Weaker MNO-2
To facilitate the analysis of the weaker MNO-2's best response to the stronger MNO-1's threshold user choice, we first introduce the MNO-1's winning threshold θ
where θ L 1 is unique for an arbitrary θ distribution with the increasing failure rate (IFR). 7 Lemma 1 presents the the weaker MNO-2's best response. The proof is given in Appendix D.
Lemma 1 (Best Response of MNO-2).
Given MNO-1's threshold user type σ 1 , MNO-2 maximizes its profit W 2 (κ, σ) by choosing a threshold user type σ * 2 (κ, σ 1 ) as follows:
(23)
and H(·) represent the PDF and CDF of users' data valuation θ, respectively.
Lemma 1 is applicable to an arbitrary θ distribution satisfying the IFR. For the illustration purpose, Fig. 4 plots the MNO-2's best response under a uniform distribution of θ, i.e., h(θ) = 1/θ max . Specifically, the red line segments (i.e., BR2-a, BR2-b, BR2-c, and BR2-d) denote σ * 2 (κ, σ 1 ). Next we discuss the physical meanings of the four different parts of best response in Lemma 1.
• BR2-a: MNO-2 gives up the competition and obtains a zero market share, i.e., (σ 1 , σ * 2 (κ, σ 1 )) ∈ Σ 2 , if MNO-1's threshold user type is smaller than its winning threshold, i.e., σ 1 < θ W 1 .
• BR2-b: MNO-2 shares the market with MNO-1, i.e., (σ 1 , σ * 2 (κ, σ 1 )) ∈ Σ 3 , if MNO-1's threshold user type is between its winning and losing thresholds, i.e., θ
• BR2-c: MNO-2 leaves MNO-1 a zero market share, i.e., (σ 1 , σ * 2 (κ, σ 1 )) ∈ Σ 1 , if MNO-1's threshold user type is between its losing and no-influence thresholds, i.e., θ
• BR2-d: MNO-2 becomes a monopoly in the market (deciding its threshold user type without considering the existence of MNO-1), i.e., σ *
, if MNO-1's threshold user type is no smaller than its no-influence threshold, i.e., θ
Best Response of the Stronger MNO-1
Now we consider the stronger MNO-1's best response to the weaker MNO-2. Similarly, we first define MNO-2's win-
Many commonly used distributions (e.g., uniform distribution, normal distribution, and gamma distribution) satisfy the IFR condition.
The outcomes in Game 1.
The illustration of Game 1 equilibriums for the five (ψ 1 , ψ 2 ) regimes shown in Fig. 6 .
where θ L 2 is unique for an arbitrary θ distribution with the IFR.
Lemma 2 (Best Response of MNO-1).
Given MNO-2's threshold user type σ 2 , MNO-1 maximizes its profit W 1 (κ, σ) by the threshold user type σ * 1 (κ, σ 2 ), which satisfies
Lemma 2 applies to an arbitrary θ distribution satisfying the IFR. 
is always negative. This means that no matter how small the MNO-2's threshold user type σ 2 is, MNO-1 can always get a positive market share, i.e., (σ * 1 (κ, σ 2 ), σ 2 ) / ∈ Σ 1 for all σ 2 . This is possible as MNO-2 is the weaker one. Fig. 5(a) represents a degenerated case of Fig. 5(b) .
Equilibrium Analysis
Based on the above best responses, i.e., σ * 1 (κ, σ 2 ) and σ * 2 (κ, σ 1 ) characterized in Lemmas 1 and 2, next we will study the threshold equilibrium of Game 1, denoted by σ Fig. 6 , the horizontal and vertical axises correspond to ψ 1 and ψ 2 , respectively. The five (ψ 1 , ψ 2 ) regions correspond to the different outcomes of Game 1. In Fig. 7 , each sub-figure represents the two MNOs' best responses under one of the five outcomes in Fig. 6 . Theorem 2. Game 1 has five different types of equilibrium based on the values of (ψ 1 , ψ 2 ), as illustrated Fig. 6 .
which is illustrated by the green circle in Fig. 7 (a). MNO-2 gives up the competition, thus MNO-1 can decide its threshold user type without considering the impact of MNO-2.
which is illustrated by the green circle in Fig. 7(b) . MNO-2 still tries to compete for market share, but in vain. However, MNO-1 has to decide its threshold user type considering the impact of MNO-2.
which is illustrated by the green circle in Fig. 7(c) . Both MNOs get strictly positive market share.
which is illustrated by the green circle in Fig. 7(d) . MNO-1 still tries to compete for market share, but in vain. However, MNO-2 has to decide its threshold user type considering the impact of MNO-1.
which is illustrated by the green circle in Fig. 7 (e). MNO-1 gives up the competition, thus MNO-2 decides its threshold user type without considering the impact of MNO-1.
Note that the threshold users type σ n corresponds to different combinations of the subscription fee and the per-unit fee (according to Definition 1). Therefore, the uniqueness of the equilibrium in Game 1 does not necessarily imply the unique pricing equilibrium in terms of the subscription fee and the per-unit fee.
So far we have characterized the equilibrium σ * (κ) in Stage II under the data mechanism κ. Next we move on to the MNOs' data mechanism selection in Stage I.
MNOS' DATA MECHANISM SELECTION IN STAGE I
In Stage I, the two MNOs will decide their data mechanisms κ = {κ 1 , κ 2 }, considering the responses from Stages II and III. Notice that we no longer needs Assumption 1, which is only used to facilitate the analysis in Stages II and III (without loss of generality). Moreover, we make Assumption 2 in this section.
Assumption 2. MNO-1's average QoS is no worse than that of MNO-2, i.e., ρ 1 ≥ ρ 2 .
Therefore, we will refer to MNO-1 and MNO-2 as the high-QoS MNO and the low-QoS MNO, respectively. Note that Assumption 2 is not a technical assumption that limits our contributions, since we can always switch the indices of the two MNOs if ρ 1 < ρ 2 .
Note that the two MNOs' costs (c 1 and c 2 ) will also play important roles in the equilibrium analysis. We will capture how the QoS values and costs interact with each other in Theorem 4 and Fig. 9 at the end of Section 6.
We model the two MNOs' data mechanism selection as the following game. 
Game 2 (Data Mechanism Selection in Stage I). The two MNOs' data mechanism selection in Stage I can be modeled as the following game:
• Strategies: Each MNO-n decides its data mechanism κ n from {T, R}.
• Preferences: Each MNO-n obtains a profit W n (κ).
In Game 2, each MNO-n decides its data mechanism κ n to maximize its own profit W n (κ), considering the threshold equilibrium σ * (κ) (derived in Theorem 2) in Stage II. To analyze Game 2, we need to specify the two-by-two profit matrix as shown in Table 3 , where the strategy of each MNO is the data mechanism κ n ∈ {T, R}. Since it is a two-by-two profit matrix, we can directly go through each of the four possible outcomes to check whether it is an equilibrium. Recall that our earlier work [8] , [21] showed that a monopoly MNO should always choose the rollover mechanism R to maximize its profit. For the duopoly market considered here, however, we will show that this is not always the case, i.e., κ = {R, R} is not always the equilibrium of Game 2.
Next we first introduce the potential market partitions at Game 2 equilibrium in Section 6.1, then we present the equilibrium κ * = {κ * 1 , κ * 2 } in Section 6.2 and Section 6.3. Finally, we graphically illustrate the equilibrium κ * in Section 6.4.
Market Partition at Game 2 Equilibrium
We characterize the three possible market partitions at a Game 2 equilibrium in Theorem 3, depending on the two MNOs' average QoS (i.e., ρ 1 and ρ 2 ) and costs (i.e., c 1 and c 2 ). The proof is given in Appendix E. (ρ 1 , ρ 2 , c 1 ), then the two MNOs share the market. Moreover, the two threshold costs are given by
We illustrate Theorem 3 in Fig. 8 under a uniform distribution of θ. Specifically, the horizontal and vertical axis corresponds to MNO-2's cost c 2 and MNO-1's cost c 1 , respectively. The two shaded (i.e., red and blue) areas represent that only one MNO obtains a positive market share. The white area represents that the two MNOs share the market. In Section 6.2 and Section 6.3, we will present the detailed equilibrium κ * for each area in Fig. 8 . Before that, let us introduce Na in Definition 3 for notation simplicity.
Definition 3.
The notation Na is used to describe the equilibriums in the following cases:
• The equilibrium κ * = (κ * 1 , Na) represents that both (κ * 1 , T) and (κ * 1 , R) are the equilibriums of Game 2.
• The equilibrium κ * = (Na, κ * 2 ) represents that both (T, κ * 2 ) and (R, κ * 2 ) are the equilibriums of Game 2.
Single-MNO-Surviving
We introduce the data mechanism equilibrium κ * of the single-MNO-surviving case in Lemma 3 and Lemma 4. The proofs are given in Appendix E.
, then the high-QoS MNO-1 obtains a positive market share, the low-QoS MNO-2 obtains a zero market share independent of his choice and the data mechanism equilibrium is κ * = (R, Na).
Furthermore, we have (ρ 1 , ρ 2 , c 1 ), then the low-QoS MNO-2 obtains a positive market share, the high-QoS MNO-1 obtains a zero market share independent of his choice and the data mechanism equilibrium is κ * = (Na, R).
Furthermore, we have
Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 reveal the impact of MNO-1's QoS advantage (i.e., ρ 1 ≥ ρ 2 ):
• When the low-QoS MNO-2 obtains a zero market share (i.e., c 1 < C Single 1 (ρ 1 , ρ 2 , c 2 )) as in Lemma 3, its choice between T and R has no effect on the high-QoS MNO-1, i.e., W 1 (R, T) = W 1 (R, R).
• When the high-QoS MNO-1 obtains a zero market share (i.e., c 2 < C Single 2 (ρ 1 , ρ 2 , c 1 )) as in Lemma 4, it can reduce the low-QoS MNO-2's profit by choosing the rollover mechanism R, i.e., W 2 (R, R) ≤ W 2 (T, R).
Coexistence
Now we consider the case where both the MNOs obtain positive market shares at Game 2 equilibrium, i.e.,
To facilitate our later discussion, we first introduce the QoS-Flip phenomenon in Section 6.3.1.
QoS-Flip Phenomenon
A counter-intuitive result that we will elaborate is that the high-QoS MNO-1 will not always attract the high valuation users. According to Theorem 1, MNO-1 attracts the high valuation users if ρ 1 V κ1 > ρ 2 V κ2 , otherwise, MNO-2 attracts the high valuation users if ρ 1 V κ1 < ρ 2 V κ2 . Recall that V κn defined in (5) depends on the data mechanism κ n ∈ {T, R}. The inequality (6) indicates
• The low-QoS MNO-2 can attract the high valuation users under the data mechanism κ = {T, R} if ρ 2 > ρ 1 V T /V R .
• The high-QoS MNO-1 can attract the high valuation users under the data mechanism κ ∈ {(T, T), (R, T), (R, R)}. Therefore, the rollover mechanism may reverse the MNO-2's QoS disadvantage. We refer to this phenomenon as QoS-flip, defined as follows:
Definition 4 (QoS-flip). The QoS-flip happens if the low-QoS MNO-2 attracts the high valuation users, i.e., ρ 2 > ρ 1 V T /V R , under the data mechanism κ = {T, R}.
In the following analysis for the equilibrium of the coexistence case, we will explain when QoS-flip happens.
Equilibrium of Coexistence Case
To present the equilibrium in the coexistence case clearly, we need to use two cost thresholds (i.e., C Roll 1 (ρ 1 , ρ 2 , c 2 ) and C Roll 2 (ρ 1 , ρ 2 , c 1 )) and two QoS thresholds (i.e.,ρ andρ), which depend on both MNOs' QoS (i.e., ρ 1 and ρ 2 ) and costs (i.e., c 1 and c 2 ). Due to the complexity of the MNOs' two-dimensional heterogeneity in QoS ρ n and cost c n , as well as the users' heterogeneity in the data valuation θ, there is no closed-form expression for C Roll 1 , C Roll 2 ,ρ, and ρ. Nevertheless, we will explain how to compute them numerically in Appendix F.
Theorem 4 presents the data mechanism equilibrium of the coexistence case.
Theorem 4.
Under the coexistence case of Game 2, there exist two QoS thresholdsρ >ρ such that the equilibrium κ * has three different possibilities: 1) When MNO-1 has a large QoS advantage over MNO-2, i.e., 0 < ρ 2 ≤ρ, the equilibrium κ * (as shown in Fig. 9(a) ) is
. 2) When MNO-1 has a small QoS advantage over MNO-2, i.e., ρ < ρ 2 ≤ρ, then the equilibrium κ * (as shown in Fig. 9(b) ) is (Na, R)
(R, T) . So far we have completely characterized the data mechanism equilibrium κ * of Game 2 in Theorems 3 and 4. Next we will use the uniformly distributed market to illustrate the equilibrium κ * . Fig. 9 visualizes the equilibrium κ * under a uniform distribution of θ. Specifically, the three sub-figures in Fig. 9 corresponds to different levels of MNO-1's QoS advantage, i.e., large for Fig. 9(a) , small for Fig. 9(b) , and negligible for Fig. 9(c) . In each sub-figure, the horizontal and vertical axises correspond to MNO-2's cost c 2 and MNO-1's cost c 1 , respectively. We label the corresponding equilibrium κ * on the (c 2 , c 1 ) plane in each sub-figure.
Equilibrium Illustration
MNO-1 Surviving:
In each sub-figure of Fig. 9 , the blue region marked by (R, Na) represents that MNO-1 becomes a monopoly in the market and leaves MNO-2 a zero market share no matter which data mechanism MNO-2 adopts. This is because that MNO-1 has enough cost advantage, i.e., c 1 < C Single 1 (ρ 1 , ρ 2 , c 2 ). In this case, there are two equilibriums, i.e., (R, T) and (R, R).
MNO-2 Surviving:
In each sub-figure of Fig. 9 , the red region marked by (Na, R) represents that MNO-2 becomes a monopoly in the market and leaves MNO-1 zero market share no matter which data mechanism MNO-1 adopts, since MNO-2 has a large cost advantage, i.e., c 2 < C Single 2 (ρ 1 , ρ 2 , c 1 ). Similarly, there are two equilibriums, i.e., (T, R) and (R, R).
Coexistence: When two MNOs' costs are comparable, i.e., c 1 ≥ C Single 1 (ρ 1 , ρ 2 , c 2 ) and c 2 ≥ C Single 2 (ρ 1 , ρ 2 , c 1 ), they will share the market. In this case, the equilibrium structure also depends on their QoS difference:
• Fig. 9(a) : MNO-1 has a large QoS advantage over MNO-2, i.e., 0 < ρ 2 ≤ρ. According to the arrow in Fig. 9(a) , the equilibrium of Game 2 gradually changes from (R, T) to (R, R) as MNO-1's cost c 1 increases or MNO-2's cost c 2 decreases. That is, the large QoS advantage enables MNO-1 to adopt rollover mechanism R all the time, but the low-QoS MNO-2 has the opportunity of upgrading to the rollover mechanism R as its cost advantage increases which compensates its QoS disadvantage.
• Fig. 9(b) : MNO-1 has a small QoS advantage over MNO-2, i.e.,ρ < ρ 2 ≤ρ. Based on the arrows in Fig. 9(b) , as MNO-1's cost c 1 increases or MNO-2's cost c 2 decreases, the corresponding equilibrium changes according to the order: (R, T) → (R, R) → (T, R). Different from the case of Fig. 9 (a), in Fig. 9 (b) the QoS-flip phenomenon happens at the equilibrium (T, R), since MNO-1's QoS advantage is not large enough and experiences a large cost.
• Fig. 9 (c): MNO-1 has a negligible QoS advantage over MNO-2, i.e.,ρ < ρ 2 ≤ ρ 1 . As MNO-1's cost c 1 increases or MNO-2's cost c 2 decreases, i.e., the arrows in Fig. 9 
(c), the corresponding equilibrium changes according to the order: (R, T) → {(R, T), (T, R)} → (T, R). We note that the symmetric equilibriums {(R, T), (T, R)} arise between
(R, T) and (T, R), instead of the (R, R) in Fig. 9(b) . This is because that the negligible QoS advantage makes the two MNOs more homogeneous and the head-tohead market competition will reduce the profits of both MNOs. Similar to the anti-coordination game (e.g., the hawk-dove game), no matter who adopts the rollover mechanism R, it is a best choice for the competitor to choose the traditional mechanism T. So far, we have finished the analysis for the three-stage competition model, and revealed that κ = {R, R} is not always the equilibrium in a competitive market, which is consistent with our practical observations mentioned in Section 1.1.
NUMERICAL RESULTS
Next we will simulate the MNOs' data mechanism equilibriums based on empirical data in Section 7.1 and evaluate the effects of rollover mechanism and market competition in Section 7.2. Before that, let us first introduce our simulation setting for mobile users and MNOs.
For mobile users, we adopt the empirical results from the previous literatures to model the monthly data demand, data valuation, and network substitutability. Specifically, we follow the data analysis results in [30] and assume that users' monthly data demand follows a truncated log-normal distribution with meand = 10 3 on the interval [0, 10 4 ], i.e., the mean value isd = 1GB and the maximal usage is D = 10GB. Moreover, we adopt the empirical study in [8] by assuming that θ follows a Gamma distribution with the 
(a) Data mechanism equilibrium κ * . shape parameter k = 4.5 and the scale parameter r = 0.11, and assuming β = 0.8.
For the MNOs, we assume that both MNOs offer a 1GB data plan, i.e., Q 1 = Q 2 = 1GB, and MNO-1 provides a better QoS than MNO-2. For simplicity, we normalize MNO-1's QoS, i.e., ρ 1 = 1, and consider three cases where MNO-2 provides different QoS, i.e., ρ 2 ∈ {0.91, 0.95, 0.99}. Mathematically, ρ 2 = 0.91 corresponds to the large QoS advantage case (mentioned in Theorem 4). The choices of ρ 2 = 0.95 and ρ 2 = 0.99 correspond to the small QoS advantage case and the negligible QoS advantage case, respectively. Due to space limit, we will only show the results of ρ 2 = 0.91 in the main paper and refer interested readers to Appendix G for the results of ρ 2 = {0.95, 0.99}.
Data Mechanism Equilibrium
We illustrate the data mechanism equilibrium κ * in Game 2 by varying MNO-1's cost c 1 , given MNO-2's cost c 2 = 40 RMB/GB.
In Fig. 10(a) , we plot the data mechanism equilibrium κ * versus MNO-1's cost c 1 , and label κ * on the top of the figure. Specifically, the blue circle lines represent MNO-1's data mechanism κ * 1 , the red triangle lines represents MNO-2's data mechanism κ * 2 . Moreover, we use two line styles (i.e., solid and dash) when there are two equilibriums. Fig. 10(b) shows the two MNOs' profits under the equilibrium κ * . Specifically, the blue circle curves and red triangle curves represent MNO-1's profit W 1 (κ * ) and MNO-2's profit W 2 (κ * ), respectively. The solid (dash, respectively) curves in Fig. 10(b) correspond to the equilibriums plotted by the solid (dash, respectively) lines in Fig. 10(a) . Overall, as MNO-1's cost c 1 increases, its profit (i.e., the blue circle curve) eventually decreases to zero, while MNO-2's profit (i.e., the red circle curves) will increase. Moreover, MNO-1 experiences a significant profit drop when the equilibrium changes from (R, T) to (R, R) at c 1 = 51 RMB/GB. In addition, the following observations validate Lemma 3 and Lemma 4: Fig. 11 : Impact of rollover mechanism on duopoly market.
• When MNO-1 obtains zero market share (c 1 > 53 RMB/GB), the two equilibriums (T, R) and (R, R) lead to different profits for MNO-2, i.e., W 2 (R, R) ≤ W 2 (T, R), which shows that the high-QoS MNO-1 may reduce MNO-2's profit by choosing the rollover mechanism R, even though it obtains zero market share.
• When MNO-2 obtains zero market share (c 1 < 23 RMB/GB), the blue solid curve and the blue dash curve overlap, which means that the two equilibriums (R, T) and (R, R) lead to the same profit for MNO-1, i.e.,
Impact of Rollover Mechanism and Competition
Now we evaluate the impact of the rollover mechanism and the market competition on the MNOs' profits. Fig. 11 (a) plots MNO-1's profit versus its cost c 1 in four scenarios. Specifically, the two black curves without markers correspond to MNO-1's monopoly market under data mechanism T and R. The blue circle curve represents MNO-1's profit in the duopoly market under the equilibrium κ * shown in Fig. 10(a) . Essentially, the blue circle curve is the same as that in Fig. 10(b) . The blue cross curve corresponds to MNO-1's profit in the duopoly market under fixed data mechanisms (T, T). In this case, the MNOs only compete on price (but not on the data mechanism choice). By comparing the black curves with the blue curves, we find that the market competition significantly reduces MNO-1's profit. By comparing the two blue curves with markers, we find that the rollover mechanism significantly increases MNO-1's profit 274% (on average) in the market competition. Fig. 11 (b) plots MNO-2's profit versus the cost c 1 in similar scenarios. Specifically, the two black curves without markers correspond to MNO-2's monopoly market. The two red curves correspond to the cases in the duopoly market. The red triangle curve is the same as that in Fig. 10(b) . The red cross curve corresponds to MNO-2's profit in the duopoly market under fixed data mechanism (T, T). By comparing the black curves with the red curves, we find that the market competition significantly reduces MNO-2's profit. The profit decrement of MNO-2 is larger than that of MNO-1, since MNO-1 has the QoS advantage and attracts high-valuation users. By comparing the two red curves with markers, we find that the rollover mechanism increases MNO-1's profit 188% (on average) in the market competition.
The above findings also hold for the small QoS advantage and negligible QoS advantage cases. Please refer to Appendix G for more details.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we studied the duopoly competition in the telecommunication market in terms of the MNOs' rollover mechanism adoption and the pricing decisions. Different from the monopoly market, where the MNO always increase its profit by adopting the rollover mechanism, the data mechanism equilibrium in the duopoly market is much more complicated. Roughly speaking, the high-QoS MNO would gradually abandon the rollover mechanism as its QoS advantage diminishes (due to its increasing cost or the competitor's decreasing cost).
In the future, we will extend the results of this paper in the following aspects. First, we would like to collaborate with MNOs and extend the current analysis by investigating real world data. Second, we will consider a more realistic oligopoly market and analyze the competition among multiple MNOs. We provide some preliminary results along this direction in Appendix A. Third, we will study the MNOs' sequential data mechanism adoptions by following the example in [22] . 
Jianwei Huang (F'16) is a Presidential Chair
Professor and Associate Dean of the School of Science and Engineering, The Chinese Uni
APPENDIX A OLIGOPOLY MARKET
In this section, we consider the competitive market with N MNOs, denoted by N = {1, 2, ..., N }. Each user makes his subscription decision given the N MNOs' pricing strategies s = {s n , ∀n ∈ N } and the data mechanisms κ = {κ n , ∀n ∈ N }. Without loss of generality, we suppose that ρ 1 V κ1 > ρ 2 V κ2 > ... > ρ N V N . The type-θ user will subscribe to MNO-n, denoted by θ ∈ Φ n , if and only if MNO-n brings him an non-negative and the largest payoff among the N MNOs, i.e.,
To facilitate later discussion on the market partition among the N MNOs, we follow (14) and define ξ m n as
We further express the neutral user type between MNO-n and MNO-m, denoted byσ m n , as follows
The market partition for N competitive MNOs are much more complicated compared with the duopoly case. Recall that there three market partitions in the duopoly market as discussed in Theorem 1. In the oligopoly case, however, there are much more competition outcomes in terms of which MNO would obtain a zero market share. Therefore, we cannot enumerate all of the outcomes one by one. Nevertheless, we summarize the coexistence outcome in Theorem 5.
Theorem 5 (Coexistence of N MNOs). Consider the N MNOs' threshold user types σ = {σ n , ∀n ∈ N } under the data mechanism selection κ = {κ n , ∀n ∈ N } and the pricing strategy s = {s n , ∀n ∈ N }. All of the MNOs obtain strictly positive market share as following
if and only if the corresponding threshold user types σ n (n ∈ N ) satisfies
(41) Fig. 12 illustrates the coexistence outcome discussed in Theorem 5. Recall that ρ n V κn represents a subscriber's marginal utility change for one unit data valuation increment. The MNO that provides a better QoS (i.e., ρ n ) and better time flexibility (i.e., κ n ), can obtain the higher valuation subscribers and charge higher prices, hence obtains more revenue. Under such a market partition, the corresponding profit of each MNO is given by
whereσ n+1 n depends on σ n and σ n+1 , given bỹ
APPENDIX B MONOPOLY MARKET AS BENCHMARK
In this section, we introduce the MNO's optimal decisions on the threshold user type and the data mechanism in the monopoly market. The results in this section is partially based on our previous results in [8] , since we assume the homogeneity in the network substitutability β.
Without loss of generality, let's consider the monopoly market of MNO-n under the data mechanism κ n and the pricing strategy s n = {Π n , π n }. According to Definition 1, we denote σ n (κ n , s n ) the threshold user type and the market share of MNO-n is Φ n = [σ n (κ n , s n ), θ max ]. Therefore, the MNO-n's expected profit under the data mechanism κ n and the pricing strategy s n is
where H(·) is the CDF of users' data valuation θ. Note that MNO-n experiences a negative profit if its corresponding threshold user type σ n (κ n , s n ) < c n /ρ n , which is a trivial case. Moreover, MNO-n will have no subscriber if its costQoS ratio c n /ρ n is greater than the users' highest data valuation θ max . With this observation, we will focus on the case where σ n (κ n , s n ) ∈ [c n /ρ n , θ max ], where we assume that c n /ρ n < θ max to avoid the trivial case. We characterize MNO-n's profit-maximizing pricing strategy s MP n and data mechanism κ MP n in Lemma 5 and Lemma 6, respectively. Here the superscript "MP" means "monopoly".
Lemma 5.
, which is the solution to the following equation:
where σ MP n (κ n ) is unique for an arbitrary θ distribution with the increasing failure rate (IFR).
Proof of Lemma 5. We prove Lemma 5 by deriving the MNO's profit-maximizing threshold user type σ MP n . Recall that the MNO-n's expected monthly profit under the data mechanism κ n and the pricing strategy s n is
Given the data mechanism κ n , the MNO's expected profit can be expressed as a function of the threshold user type σ n , as follows:
To compute the maximum value of (47), we take the derivative of (47) with respect to σ n and obtain
where h(·) is the PDF of the data valuation θ and g(·) is given by
Note that g(·) is a monotonically decreasing function if the distribution of θ satisfies the IFR. In addition, we can show that
which implies that there exists a unique σ
Combining (48) and (51), we know that
which indicates that the MNO-n maximizes its profit if its threshold user type is σ MP n , i.e.,
Lemma 5 reveals the trade-off between the subscription fee and the per-unit fee, i.e., the profit-maximizing subscription fee Π MP n and per-unit fee π MP n need to satisfy π
would lead to a smaller Π MP n , and vice versa.
Lemma 6.
Under the optimal pricing strategy in Lemma 5, a monopoly MNO-n obtains a higher profit under the rollover mechanism (than the traditional mechanism T), i.e., κ MP n = R. Proof of Lemma 6 . Under the optimal pricing strategy specified in Lemma 5, the MNO's profit is given by
Since
shows that the monopoly MNO should select the rollover mechanism R to maximize its profit. This conclusion still holds under users' two-dimensional heterogeneity on data valuation and network substitutability. We refer interested readers to our previous works in [8] .
APPENDIX C BERTRAND COMPETITION
In the main paper, we make Assumption 1 in Section 4 and Section 5. Now we consider the case of ξ(κ) = 1. More specifically, we focus on showing that our analysis for ξ(κ) = 1 (in Sections 4 and 5 of the main paper) is also applicable to the case of ξ(κ) = 1 in terms of the market partition and the MNOs' best responses.
C.1 Market Partition
We summarize the user subscription equilibrium when ξ(κ) = 1 in Theorem 6. Theorem 6 (Market Partition for ξ(κ) = 1). Consider MNOs' threshold user types σ 1 and σ 2 under the data mechanism κ = {κ 1 , κ 2 } and the pricing strategy s = {s 1 , s 2 }. There are two market competition results in the (σ 1 , σ 2 ) plane shown in Fig.  13 . 1) Σ 1 : MNO-1 has a larger threshold user type than MNO-2, i.e., (σ 1 , σ 2 ) ∈ Σ 1 where Σ 1 is
In this case, MNO-2's market share corresponds to the users with θ in Φ 2 = [σ 2 , θ max ], while MNO-1 has a zero market share Φ 1 = ∅, as shown in Fig. 14(a) . 2) Σ 2 : MNO-1 has a smaller threshold user type than MNO-2, i.e., (σ 1 , σ 2 ) ∈ Σ 2 where Σ 2 is
In this case, MNO-1 has a market share of Φ 1 = [σ 1 , θ max ], while MNO-2 has a zero market share of Φ 2 = ∅, as shown in Fig. 14(b) .
By comparing Theorem 6 with Theorem 1, we find that Theorem 6 is a special case of Theorem 1 if ξ(κ) = 1. That is, as ξ(κ) is approaching to 1, the gray region in Fig. 2 will diminish and eventually becomes Fig. 13 . Next we study the best response of each MNO based on the subscription equilibrium in Theorem 6.
C.2 Best Response
For ξ(κ) = 1, the two MNOs are symmetric, i.e., ρ 1 V κ1 = ρ 2 V κ2 . In this case, their best responses are the same. Therefore, we will take MNO-2 as example by presenting its best response to MNO-1 in Lemma 7
Lemma 7 (Best Response of MNO-2 for ξ(κ) = 1). Given MNO-1's threshold user type σ 1 , MNO-2 maximizes its profit W 2 (κ, σ) by choosing a threshold user type σ * 2 (κ, σ 1 ) as follows:
where [x] − denotes the value slightly lower than x. Fig. 15(a) illustrates the MNO-2's best response specified in Lemma 7. Specifically, the red line segments (i.e., BR2-a, BR2-b, and BR2-c) denote σ * 2 (κ, σ 1 ). Next we discuss the physical meanings of the three different parts of the best response in more details.
• BR2-a: MNO-2 gives up the competition and obtains a zero market share, i.e., (σ 1 , σ * 2 (σ 1 )) ∈ Σ 2 , if MNO-1 chooses a threshold user type smaller than its winning threshold, i.e., σ 1 ≤ θ W 1 .
• BR2-b: MNO-2 leaves a zero market to MNO-1, i.e., (σ 1 , σ * 2 (σ 1 )) ∈ Σ 1 , by choosing a threshold user type σ * 2 (κ, σ 1 ) slightly smaller than σ 1 , if MNO-1 chooses a threshold user type between its winning and no-influence thresholds, i.e., θ
• BR2-c: MNO-2 leaves a zero market to MNO-1 and decides its threshold user type as in Appendix B without
(b) Illustration of σ * 2 (κ, σ 1 ). Fig. 15 : Illustration of the best responses for ξ(κ) = 1.
considering the existence of MNO-1, i.e., σ *
as defined in (53), if MNO-1 chooses a threshold user type larger than its no-influence threshold, i.e.,
By comparing Lemma 7 with Lemma 1, we find that the MNO-2's best response under ξ(κ) = 1 is a special case of that under ξ(κ) = 1. That is, the illustration in Fig. 4 will become Fig. 15 (a) as ξ(κ) is approaching to 1.
Furthermore, the best response of MNO-1 is similar to Lemma 7, and we illustrate it in Fig. 15(b) . For an easy comparison with Fig. 15(a) , in Fig. 15(b) we plot the best response σ * 1 (σ 2 ) on the horizontal axis and the variable σ 2 on the vertical axis.
APPENDIX D
Proof of Theorem 1 . We prove Theorem 1 by characterizing the conditions of the three market partitions. Recall that the neutral user typeσ is
According to the illustration in Fig. 3(a) , MNO-2 leaves a zero market share to MNO-1 if and only if the neutral user type is no smaller than the maximal data valuation of the user group, i.e.,σ(σ 1 , σ 2 ) ≥ θ max . It is mathematically equivalent to
which corresponds to the set Σ 1 in Theorem 1. According to the illustration in Fig. 3(b) , MNO-1 leaves a zero market share to MNO-2 if and only if the threshold user type of MNO-1 is no larger than that of MNO-2, i.e., σ 1 ≤ σ 2 . It corresponds to the set Σ 2 in Theorem 1.
According to the illustration in Fig. 3(c) , both the MNOs obtain positive market shares if and only if the neutral user type is smaller than the maximal data valuation of the user group (i.e.,σ < θ max ) and the threshold user type of MNO-1 is larger than that of MNO-2 (i.e., σ 1 > σ 2 ). They are equivalent to
which corresponds to the set Σ 3 in Theorem 1.
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof of the two MNOs' best responses is similar, here we take MNO-1 as an example. We prove Lemma 2 by characterizing the best response of MNO-1 to MNO-2.
Based on Theorem 1, both the MNOs obtain positive market shares if and only if
The corresponding profit of MNO-1 is
From (62), we can derive the following two inequalities for the coexistence case regarding to σ 1
Based on (63), we take the first order derivative of W 1 (κ, σ) with respect to σ 1 and obtain
From (65), we can see that
Furthermore, under the IFR condition, we can show that g(σ 1 , σ 2 ) is decreasing in σ 1 . Therefore, when both the MNOs obtain positive market shares (i.e., the two inequalities in (64) hold), we have
(68) Specifically, J(σ 2 ) and K(σ 2 ) are given by
Note that both J(σ 2 ) and K(σ 2 ) decrease in σ 2 under the IFR condition. Now we define θ 
and derive the best response of MNO-1 based on θ
, which means that MNO-1 should give up the market competition and obtain zero market share, i.e., σ *
which means that the both MNOs obtain positive market shares, i.e., σ * 
APPENDIX E
Proof of Theorem 3. We prove Theorem 3 by deriving the conditions under which one of the MNO obtains a zero market share.
First, we derive the condition (i.e., the upper bound of c 1 ) under which MNO-2 cannot obtain a positive market share no matter what data mechanism outcome κ = {κ 1 , κ 2 }. According to Theorem 1, MNO-2 just obtains a zero market share if σ 1 = σ 2 . Therefore, we substitute σ 1 = σ 2 = σ into the threshold equilibrium condition (28) and obtain
After solving (72), we obtain
which means that MNO-2 cannot obtain a positive market share under the data mechanism outcome κ = {κ 1 , κ 2 } if
Note that the right hand side of (74) increases in ξ(κ) = ρ2Vκ 2 ρ1Vκ 1 . Therefore, we substitute the data mechanisms κ = {R, T} into the right hand side of (74) to derive C Single 1 (ρ 1 , ρ 2 , c 2 ) as follows
In this case, the data mechanism equilibrium of Game 2 is κ * = {R, Na} if c 1 < C Single 1 (ρ 1 , ρ 2 , c 2 ). Second, we derive the condition (i.e., the upper bound of c 2 ) under which MNO-1 cannot obtain a positive market share no matter what data mechanism outcome κ = {κ 1 , κ 2 }. Since MNO-1 has the advantage on the QoS, when MNO-1 just obtains zero market share, it is possible for MNO-1 to attract the high valuation users under (R, R) or the low valuation users under (T, R). Therefore, we have the following two critical conditions that lead to a zero market share for MNO-1:
We substitute σ 1 = ξ(κ)σ 2 + (1 − ξ(κ))θ max and κ = {R, R} into the threshold equilibrium condition (28) and obtain
Similarly, we substitute σ 1 = σ 2 and κ = {T, R} into the threshold equilibrium condition (28) and obtain
Combining (76) and (77), we can get the upper bound for MNO-2's cost C Single 2 (ρ 1 , ρ 2 , c 1 ) as follows:
(78) In this case, the data mechanism equilibrium of Game 2 is κ * = {Na, R} if c 2 < C 
Moreover, Lemma 5 indicates that MNO-1's optimal threshold user type σ MP 1 (R) under the rollover mechanism κ 1 = R satisfies σ
Combining (79) and (80) together, we obtain
which implies ψ 2 > σ MP 1 (R), since the data valuation θ satisfies the IFR condition. Now we have shown that ψ 2 > σ ρ 2 , c 2 ) . According to Theorem 2, it corresponds to the MNO-1's strong monopoly regime, i.e., (ψ 1 , ψ 2 ) ∈ Ψ SM 1 . That is, MNO-2 cannot affect MNO-1's profit, i.e., W 1 (R, T) = W 1 (R, R). Hence we have proved Lemma 3.
As for the case of c 2 < C Single 2 (ρ 1 , ρ 2 , c 1 ) in Lemma 4, we find that the condition c 2 < C Single 2 (ρ 1 , ρ 2 , c 1 ) cannot guarantee the MNO-2's strong monopoly regime (i.e., MNO-2's week monopoly regime is also possible), hence it is possible for MNO-1 to reduce MNO-2's profit by adopting the rollover mechanism, i.e., W 2 (R, R) ≤ W 2 (T, R).
APPENDIX F
Next we introduce how to compute the threshold values in the equilibrium structure of Game 2. We start with introducing Lemma 8.
Lemma 8.
In the coexistence case of Game 2, i.e., c 1 ≥ C Single 1 (ρ 1 , ρ 2 , c 2 ) and c 2 ≥ C Single 2 (ρ 1 , ρ 2 , c 1 ), we have
Proof of Lemma 8. Suppose the threshold equilibriums under the data mechanisms κ = (T, T) and κ = (R, T) are σ = {σ 1 , σ 2 } and σ = {σ 1 , σ 2 }, respectively. Under the data mechanisms κ and κ , MNO-1 always obtains the high valuation users. Therefore, the profits of MNO-1 in the two cases are
and
In the following, we prove
According to the definition of ξ in (14), we have
Based on the definition of the neutral user type in (15), the inequality (85) implies that
Therefore, we have
According to the best response analysis discussed in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we know σ n < σ n for all n ∈ {1, 2}. That is, both the MNOs can increase their threshold user types (by charging higher subscription fee and per-unit fee) if MNO-1 changes its data mechanism to rollover mechanism R. Accordingly, based on the definition of the neutral user type (15), we havẽ
which implies that
Recall that σ = {σ 1 , σ 2 } is the threshold equilibrium (i.e., the fixed point of the MNOs' best responses) under the data mechanism κ . Hence we have
Combining (88), (89), and (91), we obtain
Lemma 8 indicates that Game 2 never admits (T, T) as an equilibrium. The other three outcomes {(T, R), (R, T), (R, R)} are possible at the equilibrium, which depends on the MNOs' QoS ρ = {ρ 1 , ρ 2 } and costs c = {c 1 , c 2 }. Next we characterize the conditions under which one of the outcome in {(T, R), (R, T), (R, R)} becomes the equilibrium of Game 2. To emphasize the dependence of the data mechanism equilibrium on the MNOs' QoS and costs, we write MNOn's profit as W n (κ, ρ, c) for all n ∈ {1, 2}.
We first characterize MNO-1's cost upper bound, denoted by C Roll 1 (ρ, c 2 ), below which MNO-1 tends to adopt the rollover mechanism R. Mathematically, C Roll 1 (ρ, c 2 ) solves W 1 (T, R, ρ, c) = W 1 (R, R, ρ, c) with respect to c 1 . Similarly, we can derive MNO-2's cost upper bound, denoted by C Roll 2 (ρ, c 1 ), below which MNO-2 tends to adopt the rollover mechanism R. Mathematically, c 2 = C Roll 2 solves W 2 (R, T, ρ, c) = W 2 (R, R, ρ, c) with respect to c 2 . Therefore, the data mechanism equilibrium is κ * = {R, R} if 
APPENDIX G DATA MECHANISM EQUILIBRIUM
Next we provide the numerical results for ρ 2 ∈ {0.95, 0.99}.
G.1 Small QoS Advantage
MNO-1 has a small QoS advantage when ρ 2 = 0.95 (i.e., ρ 1 = 1 is a little larger than ρ 2 = 0.95).
Similarly, we plot the data mechanism equilibrium κ * versus c 1 in Fig. 16(a) , and label κ * on the top of the figure. Fig. 16(b) further simulates the corresponding profits under the equilibrium κ * . Different from Fig. 10(a) , in Fig. 16(a) we find that MNO-1 does not always adopt the rollover mechanism R all the time, which is the key difference from the case of ρ 2 = 0.91 (shown in Fig. 10(a) ). More specifically, as c 1 increases, the equilibrium varies from (R, T) to (T, R) through (R, R), which implies that: as the high-QoS MNO-1's QoS advantage diminishes owning to its increasing cost, (i) it would discard the rollover mechanism R, since its QoS advantage is not large enough; (ii) the competitor (MNO-2) will upgrade from T to R to make more profit; (iii) in this progress, it is possible for the two competitive MNOs to offer the rollover mechanism simultaneously, Similar to Fig. 10(b) , in Fig. 16(b) we find that MNO-1 experiences a profit drop when MNO-2 changes its data mechanism from T to R, i.e., c 1 = 48 RMB/GB. MNO-2 experiences a profit jump when MNO-1 changes its data mechanism from R to T, i.e., c 1 = 50.5 RMB/GB. (R, Na) ( R, T) ( R, R) (T, R) (Na, R) (a) Data mechanism equilibrium κ * . Furthermore, Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 are also reflected in Fig. 16 (b) when c 1 < 22 RMB/GB or c 1 > 52 RMB/GB. The key insights are similar to that we discussed for Fig.  10(b) . Fig. 17 (a) plots MNO-1's profit versus its cost c 1 in four scenarios. The two black curves without markers correspond to MNO-1's monopoly market under data mechanism T and R. The blue circle curve corresponds to MNO-1's profit in the duopoly market under the equilibrium κ * shown in Fig. 16(a) . Essentially, the blue circle curve is the same as that in Fig. 16(b) . The blue cross curve corresponds to MNO-1's profit in the duopoly market under fixed data mechanisms (T, T). In this case, the MNOs only compete on price (but not on the data mechanism choice). By comparing the black curves with the blue curves, we find that the market competition significantly reduces MNO-1's profit. By comparing the two blue curves with markers, we note that the rollover mechanism significantly increases MNO-1's profit 342% (on average) in the market competition. Fig. 17 (b) plots MNO-2's profit versus the cost c 1 in similar scenarios. Specifically, the two black curves without markers correspond to MNO-2's monopoly market. The two red curves correspond to the cases in the duopoly market. The red triangle curve is the same as that in Fig. 16(b) . The red cross curve corresponds to MNO-2's profit in the (R, Na) ( R, T) (R, T) (T, R) (T, R) ( Na, R) (a) Data mechanism equilibrium κ * . duopoly market under fixed data mechanisms (T, T). By comparing the black curves with the red curves, we find that the market competition significantly reduces MNO-2's profit. The profit decrement of MNO-2 is larger than that of MNO-1, since MNO-1 has the QoS advantage and attracts high-valuation users. By comparing the two red curves with markers, we note that the rollover mechanism increases MNO-1's profit 248% (on average) in the market competition.
G.2 Negligible QoS Advantage
MNO-1 has a negligible QoS advantage when ρ 2 = 0.99 (i.e., ρ 1 = 1 is almost the same as ρ 2 = 0.99).
Similarly, we plot the data mechanism equilibrium κ * versus c 1 in Fig. 18(a) , and label κ * on the top of the figure. We find that as MNO-1's cost c 1 increases, the equilibrium changes from (R, T) to (T, R) through the symmetric equilibrium {(R, T), (T, R)}. The symmetric equilibrium {(R, T), (T, R)} is the key difference between ρ 2 = 0.99 and ρ 2 = 0.95. Specifically, the symmetric equilibrium {(R, T), (T, R)} results from the two MNOs' homogeneity (due to the negligible QoS advantage and comparable costs). That is, if the two MNOs are homogeneous, no matter who chooses the rollover mechanism R, the competitor has to choose the traditional mechanism T. Fig. 18(b) plots the corresponding profits under the equilibrium κ * . When the symmetric equilibrium {(R, T), (T, R)} emerge, i.e., 40 RMB/GB < c 1 < 45.05 RMB/GB, we find that no matter who adopts the rollover mechanism R, it obtains higher profit than that when it adopts the traditional mechanism T. Fig. 19(a) and Fig. 19(b) plot MNO-1's and MNO-2' profits versus its cost c 1 in four scenarios. The insights are similar to the previous results. The rollover mechanism increases MNO-1's profit 452% (on average) and MNO-2's profit 391% (on average) in the market competition.
